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THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, THE U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, AND STATE 
EFFORTS TO LEGALIZE MARIJUANA 
 
Zachary C. Bolitho1 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A hypothetical young entrepreneur named Ernest 
recently read an article reporting that marijuana distribution 
was a lucrative business.  After extensive research and 
discussions with some friends who work in the “marijuana 
industry,” Ernest decided to open a retail store selling 
marijuana in his hometown of Raleigh, North Carolina.  He 
entered a supply agreement with a local horticulturist who was 
also an expert marijuana grower.  Ernest named his business 
“Best Buds Dispensary, Inc.,” registered it with the secretary of 
                                                 
1Assistant Professor, Campbell University School of Law, Raleigh, 
North Carolina.  The author would like to thank Evan Wright and the 
staff of the Lincoln Memorial University Law Review for the invitation to 
present this article as part of the law review’s symposium.  The author 
would also like to thank Travis LaFay and Thomas Hughes for their 
research assistance.   
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state’s office, rented a storefront in a strip mall, outfitted the 
space with display cases and shelving, hung some signs, hired 
a few employees, and opened for business on December 1, 2016.  
His dispensary sold loose-leaf marijuana, marijuana joints, and 
so-called “marijuana edibles.”   
The business operated on a cash-only basis, and 
business was booming due in part to an advertising campaign 
Ernest started on social media.   In the first week, Ernest sold 
over 60 kilograms of marijuana and generated a profit of 
$50,000.  To protect himself, his product, and his profit from 
would-be robbers, Ernest hired an armed security guard to 
serve as a sentry at the dispensary’s entrance.  Ernest opened a 
business account at the local bank.  The bank manager asked 
some questions before eventually allowing Ernest to use the 
account to deposit large amounts of cash generated from the 
dispensary. 
Ernest made no secret of the fact that Best Buds 
Dispensary, Inc. sold marijuana.  Everybody in town knew 
what he was up to, and it did not take long for Ernest to appear 
on the radar screen of agents with the federal Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA).  Within a month, DEA 
agents raided his dispensary while waiving a federal search 
warrant in the air.  The agents not only seized the marijuana 
found in the dispensary, they also went to the local bank with a 
court order authorizing them to seize the contents of Best Buds 
Dispensary’s bank account.    
A short time later, the U.S. Attorney’s Office presented 
the matter to the grand jury.  The grand jury returned an 
indictment charging Ernest with a slew of serious federal 
charges, including distribution of marijuana,2 renting a 
property for the purpose of drug distribution,3 advertising the 
distribution of a controlled substance,4 money laundering,5 and 
                                                 
221 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).  
321 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1).  This provision of the federal code is commonly 
referred to as the “crackhouse statute.”  See generally Michael E. 
Rayfield, Pure Consumption Cases under the Federal “Crackhouse” Statute, 
75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1805, 1805 (2008). 
421 U.S.C. § 843(c)(2)(A) (“It shall be unlawful for any person to 
knowingly or intentionally use the Internet, or cause the Internet to be 
used, to advertise the sale of . . . a controlled substance . . . .”).   
518 U.S.C. §§ 1956-1957. 
44                         4 LMU LAW REVIEW 2 (2017) 
 
aiding and abetting the possession of a firearm in furtherance 
of a drug trafficking crime.6  The indictment also included an 
allegation seeking forfeiture of the bank account’s contents, as 
well as any other property that Ernest obtained using the 
proceeds from his marijuana dispensary.7  If convicted, Ernest 
would be sent to federal prison for a significant period of time.8   
And, the charges were not limited to Ernest.  The grand 
jury also charged the local bank with money laundering for 
allowing Ernest to conduct financial transactions using drug 
money.9  Additionally, the grand jury charged the armed 
security guard who protected Ernest, his money, and his 
                                                 
618 U.S.C. § 2; 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). 
721 U.S.C. § 853(a) (providing for forfeiture of “any property 
constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the person obtained 
directly, or indirectly, as the result” of violating the federal drug laws).   
8Conviction on the firearm charge alone would result in a five-year 
mandatory minimum term of imprisonment.  See 18 U.S.C. § 
924(c)(1)(A)(i) (stating that a defendant convicted of a § 924(c) offense 
shall “be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 5 
years”).  And, that five-year term of imprisonment would be served 
consecutive to the imprisonment imposed on the other charges.  See 
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii) (“no term of imprisonment imposed on a 
person under this subsection shall run concurrently with any other 
term of imprisonment imposed on the person, including any term of 
imprisonment imposed for the crime of violence or drug trafficking 
crime during which the firearm was used, carried, or possessed”).   
9The bank would most likely face money-laundering charges under 18 
U.S.C. § 1956 and/or 18 U.S.C. §1957.  See Julie Anderson Hill, Banks, 
Marijuana, and Federalism, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 597, 617 (2015) (“In 
sum, a financial institution that knowingly processes transactions for 
marijuana-related businesses commits the crime of money 
laundering.”).  That is so because, generally speaking, both statutes 
prohibit banks from knowingly engaging in transactions—such as 
deposits, transfers, and withdrawals—that involve the proceeds of 
drug trafficking.  See generally Christie Smythe, HSBC Judge Approves 
$1.9B Drug-Money Laundering Accord, Bloomberg, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-07-02/hsbc-
judge-approves-1-9b-drug-money-laundering-accord (last visited 
January 19, 2017) (discussing the $1.9 million deferred prosecution 
agreement between the U.S. Department of Justice and HSBC bank to 
resolve money laundering charges stemming from transactions 
involving the proceeds of drug trafficking).           
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marijuana with possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug 
trafficking crime.10  
Now, imagine that Ernest operated his marijuana 
dispensary in Denver, Colorado instead of Raleigh, North 
Carolina.  The story would be much different.  The DEA agents 
stationed in Colorado—agents who work for the same DEA and 
are sworn to uphold the same federal laws as the DEA agents 
stationed in North Carolina—would have conducted no raids, 
secured no search warrants, and seized no funds.  The U.S. 
Attorney in Colorado—who works for the same U.S. 
Department of Justice and is sworn to uphold the same federal 
laws as the U.S. Attorney in North Carolina—would have 
sought no grand jury indictments and instituted no forfeiture 
proceedings.  Instead of contemplating what life would be like 
inside of a Federal Bureau of Prisons’ facility, Ernest would be 
in his dispensary selling marijuana and counting his (large 
amount) of cash.  He would be depositing that money in his 
account at the local bank, and his armed security guard would 
be standing by his side.  Although federal law is the same in 
Colorado as it is in North Carolina, the DEA Agents and 
Assistant U.S. Attorneys in Colorado would drive by Ernest’s 
dispensary and do nothing about his blatant and unapologetic 
violations of crystal clear federal law.   
This hypothetical, unfortunately, is not some far-fetched 
scenario dreamt up by an imaginative law professor.  No, it is 
an illustration of exactly what has been happening in the United 
States.  Marijuana is a controlled substance that is strictly 
prohibited under federal law;11 nonetheless, seven states and 
the District of Columbia have passed measures legalizing 
                                                 
1018 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A); see generally United States v. Archuleta, 19 F. 
App’x 827, 829-30 (10th Cir. 2001) (affirming § 924(c) conviction for a 
defendant whose role in the conspiracy was “kind of like a guard,” 
and who “possessed the given firearm for the specific purpose of 
providing security”).    
11See 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1) (explaining the criteria for listing a drug as 
a schedule I controlled substance); 21 U.S.C. § 812, Schedule 1(c)(10) 
(listing marijuana in schedule I); 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (stating that it is 
unlawful to “manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with 
intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled 
substance”); 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (stating that it is unlawful for “any 
person to knowingly or intentionally possess a controlled substance”).   
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marijuana for recreational use.12  And a total of twenty-six states 
have legalized marijuana for medical purposes.13  Rather than 
challenging those state laws under the Supremacy Clause, and 
instead of continuing to enforce the longstanding federal law 
equally across the country, the U.S. Department of Justice under 
Attorney General Eric Holder announced that it would neither 
seek to preempt state legalization measures14 nor (absent 
exceptional circumstances) bring federal marijuana charges 
against individuals in those states.15  Moreover, the Department 
of Justice and the Department of Treasury have informed 
financial institutions that, money laundering laws 
notwithstanding, they may “offer[][financial] services to a 
marijuana-related business.”16  And, an entire industry has 
sprung up to provide marijuana dispensaries with armed 
                                                 
12State Marijuana Laws 2016 Map (available at 
http://www.governing.com/gov-data/state-marijuana-laws-map-
medical-recreational.html).  
13Id.  
14Aug. 29, 2013 Letter from Attorney General Eric Holder to 
Governors of Colorado and Washington (stating that “the 
Department will not at this time seek to challenge your state’s law”).   
15Aug. 29, 2013 Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General James 
M. Cole to all United States Attorneys (announcing that, as an exercise 
of prosecutorial discretion, the Department would not prosecute 
marijuana cases in those states that have “legalized” marijuana, except 
in extreme cases where specified criteria were satisfied); see also 
October 19, 2009 Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General David 
W. Ogden to Selected United States Attorneys (stating that federal 
prosecutors in states that have authorized medical marijuana “should 
not focus federal resources in your States on individuals whose 
actions are in clear and unambiguous compliance with existing state 
laws providing for the medical use of marijuana”).   
16February 14, 2014 Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General 
James M. Cole to All United States Attorneys, “Guidance Regarding 
Marijuana Related Financial Crimes”; Fin. Crimes Enforcement 
Network, Dep’t of the Treasury, FIN-2014-G0001, BSA Expectations 
Regarding Marijuana-Related Businesses (Feb. 14, 2014) (providing 
guidance to banks that “should enhance the availability of financial 
services for, and the financial transparency of, marijuana-related 
businesses” in those states that passed “recent state initiatives to 
legalize certain marijuana-related activity”); see also Hill, supra note 9, 
at 604 (“The guidance explains that the agencies do not prioritize 
punishment of banks servicing state-legal marijuana businesses.”).     
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security guards.17  That same Department of Justice, however, 
has continued to prosecute marijuana cases in the remaining 
states.18   This is a problem.  Indeed, some have called it a 
“crisis,”19 others a “quagmire.”20  Regardless of what it is called, 
one thing is for certain—it must be resolved.   
It should be noted at the outset that this Article has little 
do with marijuana per se.  There is a legitimate debate to be had 
regarding our national marijuana policy.  Perhaps the time has 
come to move marijuana out of Schedule I of the Controlled 
Substances List, which would authorize it to be used 
medicinally.  Or, maybe we should consider decriminalizing 
marijuana altogether.  The fact of the matter, however, is that 
neither of those things has happened.  Instead, federal law is 
clear—marijuana is illegal in all fifty states.  If that is going to 
change, it must be done in the way our Founding Fathers 
                                                 
17Will Yakowicz, The Highly Trained Security Force Protecting Colorado’s 
Weed Stash, Inc. (Apr. 20, 2015) (available at, 
http://www.inc.com/will-yakowicz/inside-the-backbone-of-the-
cannabis-industry.html) (reporting on the activities of Blue Line 
Protection Group’s business of providing armed security for 
Colorado’s marijuana dispensaries and marijuana growing 
operations); see also Alex Kreit, What Will Federal Marijuana Reform Look 
Like?, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 689, 693-94 (2015) (recognizing that 
“every Colorado marijuana business owner who employs an armed 
security guard could wind up serving an effective life sentence in 
prison” if the 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) were enforced).      
18See generally David Sinclar, Village Man to Forfeit $1 Million in Drug 
Case, The Pilot (April 28, 2016) (available at 
http://www.thepilot.com/news/village-man-to-forfeit-million-in-
drug-case/article_3a35452a-0d72-11e6-9e61-571d44b5d3fb.html) 
(reporting that a North Carolina businessman who was convicted on 
federal marijuana and money laundering charges faced a federal 
prison sentence and was required to forfeit $1,000,000 in proceeds 
from the marijuana sales).   
19Bradley E. Markano, Enabling State Deregulation of Marijuana Through 
Executive Branch Nonenforcement, Note, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 289, 293 
(2015) (quoting David S. Schwartz, High Federalism: Marijuana 
Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 
CARDOZO L. REV. 567, 575 (2013)).     
20Melanie Reid, The Quagmire that Nobody in the Federal Government 
Wants to Talk About: Marijuana, 44 NEW MEX. L. REV. 169 (2014).   
48                         4 LMU LAW REVIEW 2 (2017) 
 
envisioned: the passage of a bill in Congress that is signed into 
law by the President.   
Along with a host of other serious matters, the future of 
federal marijuana enforcement will soon be landing on the desk 
of Jeff Sessions, the newly appointed Attorney General.  It is 
clear from his confirmation hearing testimony that Sessions is 
aware of the issue and recognizes that deciding how to handle 
it “won’t be an easy decision.”21  He further stated that “the 
United States Congress has made the possession of marijuana 
in every state and distribution of it an illegal act. . . . If that . . . 
is not desired any longer, Congress should pass the law to 
change the rule.  It’s not so much the attorney general’s job to 
decide what laws to enforce.”22  At several other points during 
the hearing, Sessions reiterated his firm commitment to 
enforcing federal law and following the Constitution.23  
Unless and until Congress changes the law, fulfilling 
that commitment will require the Department of Justice to alter 
its approach to those states that have legalized marijuana.  The 
current approach is unsustainable and sets a dangerous 
precedent that threatens the very existence of our federal 
system.  It also violates two provisions of the United States 
Constitution: (1) the Supremacy Clause; and (2) the Take Care 
Clause.    
First, state laws authorizing the possession, 
manufacture, distribution, and use of marijuana conflict with 
the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA).  More specifically, 
the state laws stand as an obstacle to the federal goal of 
eliminating the manufacture, distribution, and possession of 
marijuana.  The state laws, therefore, are preempted by 
operation of the Supremacy Clause.  Second, the Department of 
                                                 
21Alicia Wallace, Jeff Sessions Vague About Marijuana Strategy at AG 
Senate Hearing, The Cannabist, (Jan. 10, 2017) (available at, 
http://www.thecannabist.co/2017/01/10/jeff-sessions-
confirmation-hearing-marijuana-enforcement-first-day/71005/). 
22Id.   
23See Steven Dennis & Chris Strohm, Sessions Seeks to Reassure Senators 
on Race, Torture, Clinton, Bloomberg Politics (Jan. 10, 2017) (available 
at, https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-01-
10/sessions-cites-crime-rebuts-racism-in-u-s-attorney-general-bid) 
(reporting that Attorney General Sessions testified “he would enforce 
the laws and Supreme Court decisions—even those he disagreed 
with”).    
THE U.S. CONST., THE U.S. D.O.J, AND  STATE EFFORTS TO LEGALIZE MARIJUANA       49   
 
 
 
Justice’s non-enforcement policy in those states that have 
legalized marijuana represents a breach of the Presidential 
obligation to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”24  
The Take Care Clause requires the President—and his 
surrogates—to enforce the laws passed by Congress, regardless 
of whether those laws align with his policy preferences.25  The 
current approach is inconsistent with that requirement.   
Prosecutors, of course, have broad discretion in 
deciding what cases to bring.  As a former federal prosecutor, 
that discretion is something I know quite well.  Prosecutorial 
discretion, however, is not boundless.  And, it does not extend 
so far as to allow the Department of Justice to adopt a policy 
that bases the decision to prosecute on the law of the state 
where the conduct occurred.  Similarly, a state should be unable 
to fill its coffers with hundreds of millions of dollars in tax 
revenue generated from an activity that flies in the face of 
federal law while other states are deprived of such revenue by 
their commendable choice to follow federal law.26  There is 
something fundamentally wrong (and, frankly, offensive) 
about allowing people to be richly rewarded for their blatant 
and open defiance of well-settled law.27  That is especially true 
                                                 
24Art. II, § 3, U.S. Const.   
25Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo, Dream On: The Obama 
Administration’s Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the Dream Act, and 
the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781, 784 (2013) (stating that the 
“Constitution’s Take Care Clause imposes on the President a duty to 
enforce all constitutionally valid acts of Congress in all situations and 
cases”).   
26See generally Carlos Illescas, Marijuana Sales Tax Revenue Huge Boon 
for Colorado Cities, Denver Post (May 26, 2016) (available at, 
http://www.denverpost.com/2016/05/26/marijuana-sales-tax-
revenue-huge-boon-for-colorado-cities/) (discussing the millions in 
dollars of tax revenue that have been generated by the Colorado law 
permitting recreational marijuana use and reporting that city of 
Denver alone “took in $29 million last year from all sales by taxes and 
licensing fees”); see also Tanya Basu, Colorado Raised More Tax Revenue 
From Marijuana Than From Alcohol, Time Magazine (Sep. 16, 2015) 
(“Legal recreational marijuana is a boon for tax revenues in Colorado 
. . . . Colorado collected almost $70 million in marijuana taxes.”).     
27See  Lucy Rock, Marijuana Millionaires Cashing in on Cannabis 
Legalisation, The Guardian (May 22, 2016) (available at, 
https://www.theguardian.com/society/2016/may/22/cashing-in-
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when people doing the same thing in another part of the 
country are being sent to federal prison and having their money 
forfeited to the federal government.28     
This Article explains why the Department of Justice’s 
marijuana policy over the past eight years violates the 
Constitution.  Part II tells the story of how we ended up where 
we are today.  It discusses the history of federal marijuana 
regulation, including the CSA’s treatment of marijuana as a 
Schedule I drug.  Part III provides an overview of recent state 
marijuana legalization measures.  It also discusses the federal 
government’s response to those measures.  Part IV discusses the 
Supremacy Clause, and Part V discusses the Take Care Clause.   
Part VI consists of a brief conclusion.   
 
II. THE FEDERAL PROHIBITION ON MARIJUANA  
 
Marijuana has been regulated by federal law since 1937 
when Congress passed the Marihuana Tax Act.29  The Tax Act 
“allowed marijuana to be sold and prescribed medically so long 
                                                 
on-cannabis-legalisation) (reporting that one marijuana business 
owner in Washington made over $3 million in his first twenty months 
of business); see also Vickie Bane & Trevor Dodd, Marijuana 
Millionaires (July 28, 2014) (available, at 
http://people.com/archive/marijuana-millionaires-vol-82-no-4/) 
(reporting that one owner of a marijuana dispensary in Colorado  
“raked in $47,000 in 24 hours; within three months, he says, he grossed 
$1.5 million”).  
28See, e.g., United States v. White, Case No. 12-cr-03045-BCW, 2016 WL 
4473803, at *1 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 23, 2016) (rejecting motion to dismiss 
filed by defendant who was being federally prosecuted for growing 
marijuana in Missouri—a state that has not legalized marijuana); see 
also David Sinclar, Village Man to Forfeit $1 Million in Drug Case, The 
Pilot (April 28, 2016) (available at 
http://www.thepilot.com/news/village-man-to-forfeit-million-in-
drug-case/article_3a35452a-0d72-11e6-9e61-571d44b5d3fb.html) 
(reporting that a North Carolina businessman who was convicted on 
federal marijuana and money laundering charges faced a federal 
prison sentence and was required to forfeit $1,000,000 in proceeds 
from the marijuana sales).     
29Andrew Renehan, Clearing the Haze Surrounding State Medical 
Marijuana Laws: A Preemption Analysis and Proposed Solutions, 14 HOUS. 
J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 299 (2014).  
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as the requisite tax was paid.”30 Fourteen years later in 1951, 
Congress criminalized marijuana with the passage of the Boggs 
Act.31  The Boggs Act was a hard-hitting statute that imposed a 
mandatory minimum sentence of two years’ imprisonment for 
first-time marijuana offenders, five years’ imprisonment for a 
second offense, and ten years’ imprisonment for any additional 
offenses.32  The Boggs Act was largely replaced in 1970 by the 
CSA.33  The CSA was a massive enactment intended to 
“combat[] drug abuse and control[] the legitimate and 
illegitimate traffic in controlled substances.”34  To that end, the 
CSA “create[d] a comprehensive, closed regulatory regime 
criminalizing the unauthorized manufacture, distribution, 
dispensing, and possession”35 of “various plants, drugs, and 
chemicals (such as narcotics, stimulants, depressants, 
hallucinogens, and anabolic steroids.”36  Although it has been 
tweaked from time to time, the CSA remains the predominant 
federal drug law today.     
The CSA divides the regulated substances into five 
different “schedules.”  Drugs are “scheduled” based on their 
potential for abuse, accepted use for medical treatment, and 
their psychological and physical impact on the body.37  
Schedule I drugs are subject to the most stringent regulation, 
while Schedule V drugs are subject to the least.38  The 
manufacture, distribution, possession, or use of Schedule I 
                                                 
30Id.   
31Id.   
32See Alex Kreit, Controlled Substances: Crime, Regulation, and Policy 
at 408 (Carolina Academic Press 2013) (discussing the evolution of 
federal marijuana law).   
33Id. at 409.  
34Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 250 (2005).   
35Id.  
36Todd Garvey & Brian T. Yeh, State Legalization of Recreational 
Marijuana: Selected Legal Issues, Congressional Research Service (Jan. 
13, 2014).   
37Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 10 (2005).    
38Id.   
52                         4 LMU LAW REVIEW 2 (2017) 
 
drugs is flatly prohibited regardless of whether intended for 
medical or recreational use.  Schedule I drugs “may not be 
dispensed under a prescription, and such substances may only 
be used for bona fide, federal government-approved research 
studies.”39  That is so because a drug listed in Schedule I has 
been determined to have a “high potential for abuse,” “no 
currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United 
States,” and “a lack of accepted safety for use . . . under medical 
supervision.”40  From the CSA’s effective date until today, 
marijuana has been listed on Schedule I.41  As a result, it cannot 
be lawfully manufactured, distributed, or possessed anywhere 
in the United States.42 
For years, there have been efforts to move marijuana 
from Schedule I to one of the less regulated schedules.43  The 
rescheduling of marijuana could occur in two ways: (1) 
legislatively by way of an amendment to the CSA, or (2) 
administratively by the Attorney General, acting in 
consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services.44  Despite years of debate, Congress has taken no 
action to remove marijuana from Schedule I.45  The most recent 
                                                 
39Garvey, supra note 36, at 6.   
4021 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1)(A)-(C).   
4121 U.S.C. § 812, Schedule I (c)(10); Garvey, supra note 36, at 7 (“When 
Congress enacted the CSA in 1970, marijuana was classified as a 
Schedule I drug.  Today, marijuana is still categorized as a Schedule I 
controlled substance and is therefore subject to the most severe 
restrictions contained within the CSA.”).   
42Garvey, supra note 36, at 7 (“Pursuant to the CSA, the unauthorized 
cultivation, distribution, or possession of marijuana is a federal 
crime.”).  The only exception to the flat prohibition is federally 
approved research.  Raich, 545 U.S. at 13 (stating that the “sole 
exception being use of the drug as part of a Food and Drug 
Administration preapproved research study”).      
43See Raich, 545 U.S. at 13, n.23 (describing various unsuccessful efforts 
to reschedule marijuana).   
4421 U.S.C. § 811(a)-(b) (establishing the process that must be followed 
for the Attorney General to reschedule a controlled substance).   
45See Paul Lewis, A Gateway to Future Problems: Concerns About the 
State-by-State Legalization of Medical Marijuana, 13 UNIV. N. H. L. REV. 
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attempt at administrative rescheduling was denied in August 
of 2016 during the tenure of Loretta Lynch, President Obama’s 
second Attorney General.46  Moving marijuana from Schedule I 
to a less regulated schedule would not legalize marijuana for 
recreational purposes.  It would, however, allow marijuana to 
be prescribed by a physician—much like opiate-based 
painkillers (Schedule II) or anabolic steroids (Schedule III).   
Equally unsuccessful have been attempts by marijuana 
advocates to have the federal judiciary strike down the CSA’s 
regulation of marijuana.  Advocates have challenged the 
constitutionality of applying the CSA to purely intrastate 
marijuana growers and users whose actions complied with a 
California law authorizing medicinal marijuana.47  More 
specifically, the proponents argued that applying the CSA to 
homegrown marijuana would exceed Congress’ power under 
the Commerce Clause.48  The Supreme Court rejected that 
argument in Gonzales v. Raich, holding that the “regulation [of 
intrastate marijuana] is squarely within Congress’ commerce 
power because production of the commodity meant for home 
consumption . . . has a substantial effect on supply and demand 
in the national market for that commodity.”49  In support of its 
conclusion, the Court stated that Congress had reasonably 
found that allowing locally grown marijuana “would 
                                                 
49, 57 (2014) (recognizing that “federal lawmakers have been, and 
continue to be, adamantly opposed to the legalization of marijuana”).   
46Catherine Saint Louis, DEA Keeps Marijuana on List of Dangerous 
Drugs, Frustrating Advocates, New York Times (Aug. 11, 2016).  The 
2016 refusal to reschedule marijuana was not all that surprising, given 
Attorney General Lynch’s stated opposition to legalizing marijuana at 
the federal level.  See generally Matt Ferner, Loretta Lynch Says She 
Doesn’t Support Marijuana Legalization or Obama’s Views on Pot, 
Huffington Post (Jan. 28, 2015) (available at, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/01/28/loretta-lynch-
marijuana_n_6565962.html).   
47Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 6 (2005).    
48Id.   
49Id. at 20.   
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undermine the orderly enforcement of the entire regulatory 
scheme.”50   
Raich was not the first time the Supreme Court 
addressed the applicability of the CSA to state medical 
marijuana laws.  Four years earlier, the Court decided United 
States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative.51  In that case, a 
cooperative was formed to distribute medical marijuana under 
California law.52  The U.S. Department of Justice sued the 
cooperative, seeking to enjoin the cooperative on the basis that 
its conduct violated the CSA.53  The cooperative argued that the 
CSA contained an implied exception that allowed marijuana to 
be distributed and used when it was medically necessary.54  The 
Supreme Court rejected that argument because by placing 
marijuana in Schedule I, “the balance already has been struck 
against a medical necessity exception” by Congress.55  And, the 
judiciary lacks the authority to “override Congress’s policy 
choice, articulated in a statute, as to what behavior should be 
prohibited.”56   
The lower federal courts have also repeatedly rejected 
claims that the CSA’s treatment of marijuana as a Schedule I 
drug violates substantive due process or equal protection.57  Put 
simply, marijuana proponents have made very little progress at 
the federal level—marijuana is as illegal under federal law 
                                                 
50Id. at 28.   
51532 U.S. 483 (2001).   
52Id. at 486.   
53Id. at 486-87.   
54Id. at 490.   
55Id. at 499.   
56Id. at 497.   
57See e.g., Raich v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 850, 861, 866 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(“Raich II”) (rejecting argument that CSA’s treatment of marijuana as 
a Schedule I drug violated substantive due process because “federal 
law does not recognize a fundamental right to use medical 
marijuana”); United States v. Rogers, 549 F.2d 107, 108 (9th Cir. 1976) 
(rejecting argument that CSA’s treatment of marijuana was 
“irrational”); United States v. Kiffer, 477 F.2d 349, 355 (2d Cir. 1973) 
(stating “we cannot say that [marijuana’s] placement in Schedule I is 
so arbitrary or unreasonable as to render it unconstitutional”).        
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today as it was on the day the CSA was enacted in 1970.  But, 
the story has been much different in the states.  That is 
especially true of the past ten years.   
III. STATE EFFORTS TO LEGALIZE MARIJUANA AND THE 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE 
For over twenty-five years after the passage of the CSA, 
marijuana was prohibited under federal law and the laws of 
every state.58  That changed in 1996 when California passed the 
Compassionate Use Act.59  The Act allowed “seriously ill” 
patients and their caregivers to “possess[] or cultivate[] 
marijuana for the patient’s medical purposes upon the 
recommendation or approval of a physician.”60  Several years 
later, Oregon and Washington passed state laws authorizing 
medical marijuana.61  By the year 2004, ten states had such 
laws.62 
The initial federal response to those laws was 
understandably hostile given the existence of the CSA.  Federal 
officials filed lawsuits,63 obtained injunctions,64 conducted 
raids, instituted prosecutions,65 and developed a plan for 
                                                 
58Raich II, 500 F.3d at 856 (explaining that “from 1970 to 1996, the 
possession or use of marijuana—medically or otherwise—was 
proscribed under state and federal law”).   
59Id.   
60United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative, 532 U.S. 
483, 486 (2001).   
61Robert A. Mikos, On Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and the 
States’ Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1421, 
1423 n. 6 (listing states that have passed laws allowing medical 
marijuana).    
62Id.   
63See id.  
64See id.   
65See Alex Kreit, What Will Federal Marijuana Reform Look Like?, 65 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 689, 690 (2015) (“By one estimate, the federal 
government spent $483 million dollars interfering with state medical 
marijuana laws between 1996 and 2012, conducting at least 528 raids 
and dozens of prosecutions of people operating in compliance with 
state medical marijuana laws.”); see also Lewis, supra note 45, at 59 
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helping state and local police agencies fight against medical 
marijuana efforts.66  Thus, the Department of Justice “under the 
Clinton and George W. Bush Administrations” aggressively 
fought state medical marijuana legalization efforts.67   
The Department of Justice’s approach changed 
dramatically, however, after Eric Holder, Jr. was sworn in as the 
82nd Attorney General of the United States.68  The clearest sign 
that there was a new (and less stringent) sheriff in town took 
the form of a “Memorandum for Selected United States 
Attorneys” that was issued on October 19, 2009, by Deputy 
Attorney General David Ogden.  In that memorandum, Ogden 
informed U.S. Attorneys that they “should not focus federal 
resources in your States on individuals whose actions are in 
clear and unambiguous compliance with existing state laws 
providing for the medical use of marijuana.”69  The Ogden 
Memorandum represented a major policy shift by the 
Department of Justice, and marijuana reformers viewed it as a 
turning point in the fight to loosen marijuana restrictions.70  
Although the Ogden Memorandum contained its fair share of 
                                                 
(“The battle against state medical marijuana legalization intensified 
under the administration of George W. Bush, as Assistant U.S. 
Attorneys prosecuted several high-profile medical marijuana 
suppliers during these eight years.”).    
66Florence Shu-Acquaye, The Role of States in Shaping the Legal Debate 
on Medical Marijuana, 42 Mitchell Hamline L. Rev. 697, 738 (2016) 
(explaining the historical approach of the federal government to state 
medical marijuana laws). 
67Id.  
68See Lewis, supra, note 45, at 60 (stating that President Obama’s 
administration, in which Eric Holder served as Attorney General, took 
a “180-degree turn from the medical marijuana policies of its 
predecessors”).   
69October 19, 2009 Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General 
David W. Ogden to Selected United States Attorneys.   
70Lewis, supra note 45, at 60 (stating that “[i]n 2009, the Obama 
administration declared that it would take a political 180-degree turn 
from the medical marijuana policies of its predecessors”); see also Shu-
Acquaye, supra note 66, at 740 (explaining that the Ogden 
Memorandum was viewed initially as “a groundbreaking shift in 
federal drug policy”).    
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double-talk and caveats,71 it was widely viewed as a clear signal 
that “the Department of Justice (DOJ) would stop enforcing the 
federal marijuana ban against persons who comply with state 
medical marijuana laws.”72  There can be no denying that it 
provided a huge boost to the efforts of state marijuana 
legalization proponents.  Additional states moved almost 
immediately to legalize medical marijuana, and “the 
nationwide medical marijuana industry . . . [has grown] at a rate 
of 13.8 percent since 2009.”73   
In a move that surprised many observers, the 
Department appeared to take a step back on June 29, 2011 with 
the release of a Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General 
James Cole.  That memorandum was entitled “Guidance 
Regarding the Ogden Memo in Jurisdictions Seeking to 
Authorize Marijuana for Medical Use,” and it reaffirmed the 
Department of Justice’s commitment “to the enforcement of the 
Controlled Substances Act in all States.”74  And, it further stated 
that the Ogden Memorandum was “never intended to shield” 
large commercial, industrial marijuana growing operations 
from “federal enforcement action and prosecution, even where 
those activities purport to comply with state law.”75  Despite the 
2011 Cole Memorandum, state marijuana legalization measures 
did not stop.   
In fact, they intensified—branching out from medical 
marijuana to legalization of marijuana for recreational 
purposes.76  Both Colorado and Washington passed measures 
                                                 
71For example, the Memorandum stated that it was merely “guidance” 
and that “no State can authorize violations of federal law.” 
72Robert A. Mikos, A Critical Appraisal of the Department of Justice’s New 
Approach to Medical Marijuana, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 633, 633 (2011).   
73Lewis, supra note 45, at 62 (quoting statistics compiled by IBSWorld, 
a marijuana industry reporting company).   
74June 29, 2011 Memorandum from James M. Cole to All United States 
Attorneys. 
75Id.   
76COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16.   
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in November of 2012 that legalized recreational marijuana.77  A 
short time later, the Department of Justice issued yet another 
Memorandum relating to state marijuana legalization efforts.  
In that Memorandum issued on August 29, 2013, Deputy 
Attorney General James Cole told federal prosecutors in those 
states that have legalized marijuana to leave even the large-
scale industrial marijuana growers alone, so long as they were 
operating in compliance with eight principles:  (1) not selling to 
minors; (2) preventing money from going to criminal gangs and 
cartels; (3) preventing diversion to those states that have not 
legalized marijuana; (4) not using the distribution of marijuana 
as a cover for trafficking in other drugs; (5) avoiding violence 
and the use of firearms; (6) preventing impaired driving and 
other public health issues associated with marijuana use; (7) not 
growing marijuana on public lands; and (8) not possessing or 
using marijuana on federal property.78 
Also on August 29, 2013, Attorney General Holder sent 
a letter to the governors of Colorado and Washington.  In that 
letter, Attorney General Holder informed the governors that the 
Department of Justice would “not at this time seek to challenge 
your state’s law.”79  Put another way, Attorney General Holder 
assured the governors that the Department of Justice would not 
seek to preempt the Colorado and Washington laws under the 
Supremacy Clause.  That letter, combined with the Cole 
Memorandum issued the same day, was tantamount to the 
Department of Justice waving the white flag of surrender.  It 
was surrender, however, to a battle that the Department had 
stopped trying to win four years earlier.  And, the marijuana 
industry responded by aggressively expanding the list of states 
                                                 
77Aaron Smith, Marijuana Legalization Passes in Colorado, Washington, 
CNNMoney (Nov. 8, 2012) (available at, 
http://money.cnn.com/2012/11/07/news/economy/marijuana-
legalization-washington-colorado/).   
78Aug. 29, 2013, Memorandum from James M. Cole to All United 
States Attorneys at, 1-2.   
79Letter from Attorney General Eric Holder to Governors of Colorado 
& Washington (Aug. 29, 2013).   
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that allow marijuana to be used in one form or another.  
California, Oregon, Nevada, Alaska, Massachusetts, Maine, 
and the District of Columbia have all recently joined Colorado 
and Washington by legalizing recreational marijuana.80  The 
number of states authorizing medical marijuana is now at 
twenty-six, plus the District of Columbia.81  Thus, over half of 
the states now expressly permit what federal law expressly 
prohibits.  The Department of Justice has allowed blatant 
violations of the CSA’s marijuana prohibition in those states, 
but at the same time it has continued to enforce those same 
marijuana prohibitions in other states.  That is the status quo, 
and it raises serious constitutional problems.  Those problems 
are discussed below.  
 
 IV. PREEMPTION  
As things stand today, on one side there is a federal law 
that prohibits manufacturing, distributing, and possessing 
marijuana.  On the other side, there are state laws that authorize 
manufacturing, distributing, and possessing marijuana.  Under 
the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution when federal 
and state law clash, federal law prevails, and the state law is 
preempted.82  That is what should happen here—the state laws 
legalizing marijuana must give way to the federal CSA.  
                                                 
80State Marijuana Laws in 2016 Map (available at, 
http://www.governing.com/gov-data/state-marijuana-laws-map-
medical-recreational.html.)  
81Id.   
82U.S. CONST. art. VI,   (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United 
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties 
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United 
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every 
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws 
of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”); see Mikos, supra note 
61, at 1422 (explaining that “if Congress possesses the authority to 
regulate an activity, its laws reign supreme and trump conflicting 
state regulations on the same subject”).     
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Although some legal commentators have said as much,83 the 
issue has not been addressed by the federal courts because the 
Department of Justice refused to file a lawsuit against the 
offending states.84  There is, however, a new captain steering 
the ship at the Department of Justice.  With the swearing in of 
Jeff Sessions as Attorney General comes the possibility of a 
lawsuit seeking to preempt state laws that conflict with the 
CSA.  If Attorney General Sessions chooses to go down that 
road, he will have a strong legal argument.     
Preemption is a “doctrine of American constitutional 
law under which states and local governments are deprived of 
their power to act in a given area” due to the existence of a 
federal law that operates in that same area.85 The Supreme 
Court has recognized two broad categories of preemption: (1) 
express preemption, and (2) implied preemption.86  Express 
preemption occurs when Congress passes a statute that 
explicitly withdraws certain powers from the states.87  In 
circumstances where Congress has failed to make an explicit 
                                                 
83See, e.g., Brandon P. Denning, Vertical Federalism, Horizontal 
Federalism, and Legal Obstacles to State Marijuana Legalization Efforts, 65 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 567, 579 (2015) (explaining that “[i]t seems 
axiomatic that the Supremacy Clause and preemption doctrine 
prohibit states” such as Colorado and Washington from allowing 
marijuana when federal law prohibits it);  Garvey, supra note 36,  at 7 
(“The Colorado and Washington laws, which legalize, regulate, and 
tax an activity the federal government expressly prohibits, appear to 
be logically inconsistent with established federal policy and are 
therefore likely subject to a legal challenge under the constitutional 
doctrine of preemption.”); but see Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of 
Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and the States’ Overlooked Power to 
Legalize a Federal Crime, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1421, 1423-24 (2009) (opining 
that preemption of state marijuana laws would run afoul of the Tenth 
Amendment’s anti-commandeering principle).          
84Aug. 29, 2013 Letter from Attorney General Eric Holder to 
Governors of Washington & Colorado 
85James T. O’Reilly, Federal Preemption of State and Local Law: 
Legislation, Regulation and Litigation at 1 (ABA Publishing 2006).   
86See generally Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 226 (2000) 
(providing overview of preemption law).   
87Id.   
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statement, state law may still be displaced under the doctrine of 
implied preemption.88  Implied preemption “occurs where 
Congress, through the structure or objectives of a federal 
statute, has impliedly precluded state regulation of that area.”89  
Regardless of whether a case involves express or implied 
preemption, the judiciary’s task is the same:  “to determine 
whether state regulation is consistent with the structure and 
purpose of the [federal] statute as a whole.”90  Or stated another 
way, “the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in 
every pre-emption case.”91   
Over the years, the Supreme Court has come to 
recognize two types of implied preemption: (1) field 
preemption, and (2) conflict preemption.92  Field preemption 
occurs when federal law has been so dominant in a particular 
area that “Congress left no room for the States to supplement 
it.”93  Conflict preemption can take two forms. The first is called 
physical impossibility preemption, and it occurs when 
“compliance with both federal and state regulations is a 
physical impossibility.”94  The second is called obstacle 
preemption, and it occurs when “state law stands as an obstacle 
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
objectives of Congress.”95   
With respect to the battle between state marijuana laws 
and the CSA, express preemption is inapplicable because the 
CSA does not explicitly remove the possibility of state 
regulation of drugs.  The CSA does, however, contain a 
                                                 
88O’Reilly, supra note 85, at 65.   
89Id.   
90Denning, supra note 83, at 572 (internal quotations omitted).    
91Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009) (internal quotations 
omitted).   
92Id. at 572.   
93Nelson, supra note 86, at 227 (internal quotations omitted).   
94Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & 
Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 204 (1983) (internal quotations omitted).   
95Id. (internal quotations omitted)  
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preemption provision in 21 U.S.C. § 903.  Section 903 provides 
as follows:    
 
No provision of this subchapter shall be 
construed as indicating an intent on the part of 
the Congress to occupy the field in which that 
provision operates, including criminal penalties, 
to the exclusion of any State law on the same 
subject matter which would otherwise be within 
the authority of the State, unless there is a 
positive conflict between that provision of this 
subchapter and that State law so that the two 
cannot consistently stand together.96 
 
 Section § 903 clearly takes field preemption off the 
table.97  Equally clear from § 903 is Congress’s intent to ensure 
that conflict preemption remains on the table.  Looking to the 
two subsets of conflict preemption, it has traditionally been 
very difficult to succeed on a physical impossibility preemption 
theory.98  To do so, it must be proven that “state law requires 
what federal law prohibits, or state law prohibits what federal law 
requires.”99  That is not present here because a person in, say, 
Colorado could comply with both federal and state law by 
                                                 
9621 U.S.C. § 903.   
97Garvey, supra note 36, at 9 (stating that § 903 “clarifies that Congress 
did not intend to entirely occupy the regulatory field concerning 
controlled substances or wholly supplant traditional state authority in 
the area”).   
98Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 573 (2009) (“Impossibility pre-
emption is a demanding defense.”); see also Garvey, supra note 36, at 
10 (“Courts have only rarely invalidated a state law as preempted 
under the impossibility prong of the positive conflict test.”).   
99Garvey, supra note 36, at 10 (emphasis in original); see also Erwin 
Chemerinksy, Constitutional Law: Principles & Policies at 391 (2d ed. 
2002) (“If federal law and state law are mutually exclusive, so that a 
person could not simultaneously comply with both, the state law is 
deemed preempted.”).   
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refraining from the manufacture, distribution, and possession 
of marijuana.100   
But, there is an argument to be made that this is not the 
correct way to view physical impossibility preemption.  
According to Professor Brandon Denning, viewing physical 
impossibility preemption in that way renders the doctrine 
meaningless because “a finding of impossibility could always 
be avoided simply by refraining from engaging in the activity 
that is the object of the conflicting regulatory regimes.”101  As 
Professor Denning has explained, physical impossibility 
preemption only serves a purpose if it is “viewed from the 
perspective of one who is engaging in the very conduct 
regulated by both state and federal governments.”102  Under 
that conception of physical impossibility preemption, state laws 
legalizing marijuana would be preempted because it would be 
physically impossible for a person in Colorado to open a 
marijuana dispensary under state law without simultaneously 
violating federal law.103  Although it is certainly an appealing 
argument, Professor Denning’s approach is somewhat difficult 
to reconcile with language found in the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson.104  
In Barnett Bank, the Court was considering whether a 
federal law that authorized national banks to sell insurance in 
small towns preempted a state law that prohibited national 
                                                 
100Nelson, supra note 86, at 228 n.15 (nothing that the Supreme Court 
has held that “if one sovereign’s law purports to give people a right 
to engage in conduct that the other sovereign’s law purports to 
prohibit, the ‘physical impossibility’ test is not satisfied; a person 
could comply with both state and federal law simply by refraining 
from the conduct. Thus, even when state and federal law contradict 
each other, it is physically possible to comply with both unless federal 
law requires what state law prohibits (or vice versa)”). 
101Denning, supra note 83, at 578.   
102Id.   
103Id. at 578-79.   
104517 U.S. 25, 31 (1996).   
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banks from doing precisely that.105  Although the Court found 
the state law to be preempted under the doctrine of obstacle 
preemption, it rejected the physical impossibility preemption 
argument.  In doing so, the Court explained that this was not a 
situation where “the federal law said, ‘you must sell insurance,’ 
while the state law said, ‘you may not.’”106  Because a national 
bank could comply with both state and federal law by refusing 
to sell insurance, there was no physical impossibility 
preemption.107  Thus, the argument goes, physical impossibility 
preemption is inapplicable to the marijuana conundrum 
because there is an easy way to comply with both laws—do not 
grow, distribute, or possess marijuana.  Given the language of 
Barnett Bank and the Court’s treatment of physical impossibility 
preemption as a “very narrow” doctrine,108 it is unlikely that 
state marijuana legalization measures would be preempted 
under that doctrine.  
It seems more likely that state marijuana legalization 
measures would be preempted under the second subset of 
conflict preemption—obstacle preemption.109  Obstacle 
preemption is appropriate when the state law “stands as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full 
                                                 
105Id. at 27 (“The question in this case is whether a federal statute that 
permits national banks to sell insurance in small towns pre-empts a 
state statute that forbids them to do so.”).   
106Id. at 31.   
107See Emerald Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 230 
P.3d 518, 528 (Or. 2010) (en banc) (explaining that in Barnett Bank it 
was not physically impossible to comply with both state and federal 
law because “[a] national bank could simply refrain from selling 
insurance”); see also Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 590 (2009) (Thomas, 
J., concurring in judgment) (questioning the physical impossibility 
preemption doctrine in part because federal and state law may give 
conflicting commands even though “an individual could comply with 
both by electing to refrain from the covered behavior”).    
108Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 589 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring).   
109Garvey & Yeh, supra note 36, at 10-11 (focusing analysis more on 
obstacle preemption than physical impossibility preemption because 
the state laws “would likely survive the impossibility prong”).   
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purposes and objectives of Congress.”110  To determine whether 
a state law serves as an obstacle, the courts must “examin[e] the 
federal statute as a whole and identify[] its purpose and 
intended effects.”111 
Determining the purpose of the CSA is an easy task.  It 
was drafted with one goal in mind—eliminating the abuse, 
production, and illicit trafficking of certain psychotropic 
drugs.112  To achieve that goal, Congress created a 
comprehensive regulatory regime prohibiting the possession, 
distribution, or manufacture of certain drugs (i.e., Schedule I) 
and regulated the possession, distribution, or manufacture of 
other drugs (i.e., Schedules II-V).113  In doing so, Congress made 
clear that the CSA applies to drugs that are manufactured, 
distributed, and possessed purely intrastate.114  Congress found 
that such “[f]ederal control of the intrastate incidents of the 
traffic in controlled substances is essential to the effective 
control of the interstate incidents” of drug trafficking.115  
Congress believed that its ultimate objective could not be 
reached if there were an exemption that allowed the 
manufacture, distribution, or possession of locally grown 
marijuana.  
The application of the CSA to purely intrastate activity 
was attacked in Gonzalez v. Raich as an unconstitutional exercise 
of Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause.  In Raich, 
the Supreme Court upheld the CSA and declared that Congress 
                                                 
110Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. 
Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 204 (1983). 
111Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501 (2012) (internal 
quotations omitted).   
112See 21 U.S.C. § 801a(1) (setting forth Congress’s findings regarding 
the need for the CSA); see also Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 13, 20 (2005) 
(“The main objectives of the CSA were to conquer drug abuse and to 
control the legitimate and illegitimate traffic in controlled 
substances.”).     
113Raich, 545 U.S. at 13-14.  
11421 U.S.C. § 801(3)-(6).   
11521 U.S.C. § 801(6).   
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had the authority to regulate even locally grown marijuana that 
never crossed a state line.116  According to the Court, exempting 
marijuana that was “locally cultivated for personal use . . . may 
have a substantial impact on the interstate market for this 
extraordinarily popular substance.”117  And, the Court 
recognized that a state law authorizing the use of medical 
marijuana (even if locally grown) would “have a significant 
impact on both the supply and demand sides of the market for 
marijuana.”118  Perhaps most importantly for purposes of the 
current debate, the Raich Court spoke approvingly of 
Congress’s determination that allowing intrastate marijuana to 
escape the CSA’s reach “would undermine the orderly 
enforcement of the entire regulatory scheme.”119   
Such undermining, however, has been occurring since 
the Ogden Memorandum was released in 2009.  Because of state 
legalization efforts and Department of Justice acquiescence, the 
CSA’s regulatory scheme has been significantly undermined.  
The goal of the CSA was to eliminate the market for marijuana, 
and “[l]iberal regimes like Colorado’s and Washington’s are 
diametrically opposed to th[at] goal.”120  It does not take a law 
degree to see that a state law authorizing the production, 
distribution, and use of marijuana makes it difficult for the 
federal government to achieve its goal of eradicating marijuana.  
It is made even more difficult when the state actually benefits 
from increased use of the substance that federal law is trying to 
decrease.   
                                                 
116Raich, 545 U.S. at 19.  For those unfamiliar with the case, Raich 
involved several individuals who sought to use and grow marijuana 
for medicinal purposes under California’s Compassionate Use Act.  Id. 
at 5-7.  The individuals sued the Attorney General of the United States, 
seeking a declaration that the CSA’s prohibition on the manufacture, 
distribution, and possession of marijuana was unconstitutional as 
applied to locally grown marijuana that did not travel in interstate 
commerce.  Id. at 7.       
117Id. at 28.   
118Id. at 30.   
119Id. at 28.   
120Denning, supra note 83, at 579.   
THE U.S. CONST., THE U.S. D.O.J, AND  STATE EFFORTS TO LEGALIZE MARIJUANA       67   
 
 
 
Take Colorado, for example.  It legalized marijuana for 
recreational use in 2012, and in 2015 Colorado collected 
approximately $135 million in tax revenue from the marijuana 
industry.121  That money has been used to fund a variety of state 
programs and projects ranging from school construction and 
street paving to bullying prevention.122  If people stop selling, 
smoking, and growing marijuana in Colorado, then the state 
and local governments will lose money.  If the government loses 
money, it will cut programs and services.  No government 
desires to do either of those things.  So, what does Colorado 
want?  More marijuana sales!  When do they want them?  Now!      
The good news for Colorado is that it is getting what it 
wants.  The data shows that when a state legalizes marijuana, 
use of the drug increases in that state.123  That should come as 
                                                 
121National Public Radio, All Things Considered, Where Does 
Colorado's Marijuana Money Go? (Oct. 1, 2016) (transcript available at, 
http://www.npr.org/2016/10/01/496226348/where-does-
colorados-marijuana-money-go). 
122Id. (reporting that money from marijuana tax revenues was used to 
build schools, provide for the homeless, and create college 
scholarships); see also Carlos Illescas, Marijuana Sales Tax Huge Boon for 
Colorado Cities, Denver Post (May 26, 2016) (available at, 
http://www.denverpost.com/2016/05/26/marijuana-sales-tax-
revenue-huge-boon-for-colorado-cities/) (quoting an official of a 
small Colorado town as saying:  “We have such as small tax base . . . 
.Medical and retail marijuana have definitely helped the town’s 
bottom line. I’d be lying if I said it didn’t.”);  Mahita Gajanan, Colorado 
Will Use Extra Marijuana Revenue to Prevent Bullying in Schools, Time 
Magazine (Sep. 28, 2016) (available, at 
http://time.com/4511895/colorado-surplus-marijuana-tax-revenue-
bully-prevention/) (reporting that $2.9 million in  marijuana tax 
revenues was used to create a bullying prevention program at 50 
schools).     
123Beau Kilmer, If California legalizes marijuana, consumption will likely 
increase. But is that a bad thing?, LOS ANGELES TIMES (May 16, 2016) 
(reporting that after legalization, marijuana use increased in Colorado 
and Washington); see also Rocky Mountain High Intensity Drug 
Trafficking Area, The Legalization of Marijuana in Colorado: The Impact 
(Jan. 2016) (available at, 
http://www.rmhidta.org/html/FINAL%20NSDUH%20Results-
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no surprise.  After all, allowing “profit-maximizing firms to 
produce, sell, and advertise”124 an item that was previously 
only available on the black-market will result in an increase in 
that item’s use.  So, state legalization efforts have led to an 
increase in the very activity that the CSA prohibits and seeks to 
eliminate altogether.     
That type of conflict between the effect of a state law and 
the objective of a federal law is what obstacle preemption is 
designed to address.  When previously confronted with an 
analogous situation, the Supreme Court struck down the 
offending state law in Michigan Canners & Freezers v. 
Agricultural Board.125  The Michigan Canners Court held that the 
federal Agricultural Fair Practices Act preempted the Michigan 
Agricultural Marketing and Bargaining Act because the 
Michigan law stood “as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”126  
The federal law was designed to improve the bargaining 
power of farmers when they brought their food to market.127  
One provision of the federal law prevented an association of 
food producers from interfering with an individual producer’s 
decision about whether to bring food to the market individually 
or to sell it through a producers’ association.128  The Michigan 
law, on the other hand, stated that a producers’ association was 
the exclusive bargaining agent for all producers of a particular 
                                                 
%20Jan%202016%20Release.pdf) (stating that “in the two year 
average (2013/2014) since Colorado legalized recreational marijuana, 
youth past month marijuana use increased 20 percent compared to the 
two year average prior to legalization (2011/2012)” while at the same 
time “nationally youth past month marijuana use declined 4 
percent”); Robert A. Mikos, Preemption Under the Controlled Substances 
Act, 16 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 5, 17 (2013) (“There is little doubt, 
then, that marijuana use will increase following state legalization.”).          
124Kilmer, supra note 123.   
125467 U.S. 461 (1984).   
126Id. at 478 (internal quotations and citations omitted).   
127Id. at 463-64.   
128Id. at 464.   
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food item.129  Individual producers were required to pay a fee 
to the association and abide by the terms of the association’s 
contracts.130  In other words, the Michigan law “empower[ed] 
producers’ associations to do precisely what the federal Act 
forbids them to do.”131  The Michigan law, therefore, was struck 
down by the Supreme Court under the obstacle preemption 
doctrine.132 
Just like the Michigan law authorized producers’ 
associations to engage in conduct that federal law prohibited, 
those states that have legalized marijuana have “empower[ed] 
[marijuana growers, distributors, and users] to do precisely 
what the federal Act forbids them to do.”133  It is difficult to 
escape that reality.134  So, why has no federal court ruled that 
the CSA preempts state marijuana legalization laws?  Because 
the Department of Justice—through its “policy of benign 
neglect”135—has refused to bring a lawsuit challenging state 
marijuana legalization laws as preempted under the obstacle 
preemption doctrine.136   
In response to the Department of Justice’s decision not 
to file a preemption lawsuit, Oklahoma and Nebraska made a 
valiant effort to have the Supreme Court rule on the issue.  They 
                                                 
129Id. at 466.   
130Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass’n, 467 U.S. at 467-68.   
131Id. at 477-78.   
132Id. at 478 (holding that the Michigan law “stands as an obstacle to 
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives 
of Congress” and “therefore, the Michigan Act is pre-empted”) 
(internal quotations and citations omitted).   
133Id. at 477-78.   
134See generally Denning, supra note 83, at 580 (“At the risk of seeming 
obtuse, I find it self-evident that state legalization regimes permitting 
marijuana use for medical or recreational purposes present a 
substantial obstacle to the implementation of a federal law that (1) 
recognizes no medical use for marijuana and (2) seeks to eliminate the 
national market in marijuana by banning all production, possession, 
and transfer.”)  
135Denning, supra note 83, at 583.   
136Id. at 581 (stating that “[o]nly the DOJ’s announced policy of 
forbearance keeps this conflict from coming to a head”).   
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brought a lawsuit against Colorado directly in the Supreme 
Court pursuant to Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution 
and 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a), both of which vest the Supreme Court 
with “original jurisdiction” over a lawsuit between two 
states.137  In that lawsuit, Oklahoma and Nebraska argued that 
Colorado’s marijuana legalization law “conflicts with and 
otherwise stands as an obstacle to the full purposes and 
objectives of Congress.”138  For reasons unknown and unstated, 
the Supreme Court refused to exercise its jurisdiction to hear 
the case.139   
Although no federal court has ruled on the preemption 
issue, a handful of state courts have addressed it.140  Of that 
handful of courts, the most notable opinion is the Supreme 
Court of Oregon’s in Emerald Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Bureau of 
                                                 
137Motion for Leave to File Complaint, Nebraska & Oklahoma v. 
Colorado, Supreme Court of the United States (Dec. 18, 2014) 
(available at, http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/12/Neb.-Okla.-original-suit-vs.-Colorado-12-
18-14.pdf).   
138Id. at 23.   
139Nebraska, et al. v. Colorado, 136 S. Ct. 1034 (2016) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting from the denial of motion for leave to file complaint) 
(arguing that the Court should have exercised its original jurisdiction 
to hear the case instead of “denying, without explanation, Nebraska 
and Oklahoma’s motion for leave to file a complaint”).  In the wake of 
the Supreme Court’s refusal to hear the case, Nebraska and Colorado 
sought permission to intervene in a lawsuit brought by some private 
parties against Colorado.  That lawsuit had been previously dismissed 
by a U.S. District Court judge on the basis that private parties could 
not seek preemption under the Supremacy Clause.  Safe Streets 
Alliance, et al. v. John Hickenlooper, Governor of Colorado, et al., No. 1:15-
CV-00349, 2016 WL 223815, at *3, *5 (D. Colo. Jan. 19, 2016).  The 
plaintiffs appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, and 
Nebraska and Oklahoma sought permission to intervene in that 
appeal.  The Tenth Circuit allowed the intervention, and the parties 
are awaiting a decision on the merits.  Safe Streets Alliance, et al. v. John 
Hickenlooper, Governor of Colorado, Order Granting Motion to 
Intervene, Appeal No. 16-1048 (10th Cir. Dec. 22, 2016).             
140See Garvey & Yeh, supra note 36, at 14-15 (summarizing several state 
court rulings).   
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Labor and Industries.141  The Emerald Steel court concluded that 
the CSA preempted Oregon’s Medical Marijuana Act, which 
provided that people who had been issued a medical marijuana 
card could manufacture, distribute, and possess marijuana.142  
According to the court, the Oregon law stood “as an obstacle to 
the accomplishment of the full purposes of the federal law.”143  
The court further explained that when Congress passed the 
CSA, it “did not intend to enact a limited prohibition on the use 
of marijuana—i.e., to prohibit the use of marijuana unless a 
state chose to authorize its use.”144  Instead, Congress meant for 
the CSA to “impose[] a blanket prohibition on the use of 
marijuana without regard to state permission to use.”145  And, 
there is no U.S. Supreme Court precedent holding that “states 
can authorize their citizens to engage in conduct that Congress 
explicitly has forbidden.”146 Some scholars147 and a few 
                                                 
141348 Or. 159 (2010) (en banc).   
142Id. at 161; but see County of San Diego v. San Diego NORML, 81 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 461, 482 (Cal. App. Ct. 2008) (holding that the CSA does not 
preempt California’s medical marijuana identification card law 
because “the purpose of the CSA is to combat recreational drug use, 
not to regulate a state’s medical practices”).     
143Emerald Steel Fabricators, Inc., 348 Or. at 186.   
144Id. at 177-78.   
145Id. at 178.   
146Id. at 183.   
147See Sam Kamin, Pot Prohibition is Almost Over; Oklahoma, Nebraska’s 
Suit is Doomed, THE CANNABIST (Jun. 29, 2015) (available at, 
http://www.thecannabist.co/2015/06/29/pot-marijuana-
oklahoma-nebraska-lawsuit-colorado/37014/#disqus_thread) (law 
professor opining that Colorado’s marijuana legalization measure is 
not preempted by the CSA because “the federal government cannot 
force state officials (cannot commandeer them, to use the 
constitutional term) to enforce” federal law); see also Robert A. Mikos, 
On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and the States’ Overlooked 
Power to Legalize a Federal Crime, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1421, 1423-24 (2009) 
(arguing that “to say that Congress may thereby preempt state 
inaction (which is what legalization amounts to, after all) would, in 
effect, permit Congress to command the states to take some action—
namely, to proscribe medical marijuana.  The Court’s anti-
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judges148 have argued that a finding that the CSA preempts 
state marijuana legalization laws would run afoul of the anti-
commandeering principle embodied in the Tenth Amendment 
to the U.S. Constitution.  That argument is creative and 
thought-provoking.  But, it is wide of the mark—at least as it 
relates to what has actually happened in those states that have 
legalized marijuana.   
The Tenth Amendment provides as follows:  “The 
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, 
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people.”149  The Supreme Court has read 
that language to prevent the federal government from 
“commandeering” state governments by requiring them to 
enforce federal law.150  Perhaps the most significant anti-
commandeering case is Printz v. United States.151  At issue in 
Printz was the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, which 
contained a provision requiring state and local police officers to 
conduct background checks on handgun purchasers.152  The 
Court struck down that provision under the Tenth Amendment 
because the federal government “may not compel the State to 
enact or administer a federal regulatory program.”153 
Undoubtedly, the anti-commandeering doctrine 
applied in Printz would prevent the federal government from 
forcing state and local police officers to enforce the CSA’s 
marijuana prohibition.  It is also beyond debate that the federal 
                                                 
commandeering rule, however, clearly prohibits Congress from doing 
this.”).    
148See, e.g., Emerald Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 
348 Or. 159, 191 (2010) (en banc) (Walters, J., dissenting) (citing the 
anti-commandeering doctrine as one of the reasons why the CSA does 
not preempt Oregon’s medical marijuana law).   
149U.S. CONST. amend. X,   
150New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (holding that 
“[t]he Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or 
administer a federal regulatory program”).   
151521 U.S. 898 (1997).   
152Id. at 903.   
153Id. at 933 (internal quotations omitted).   
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government could not mandate that all states criminalize 
marijuana.  Neither of those things, however, would result from 
a court holding that the CSA preempts state marijuana 
legalization laws.  A finding that the CSA preempts a state 
marijuana legalization law would result in the state having no 
law—authorizing or forbidding—marijuana.  And, that is 
entirely constitutional because states are free by virtue of the 
anti-commandeering doctrine to decriminalize marijuana 
through the repeal of their laws that prohibit the manufacture, 
distribution, and possession of marijuana.154   
There is, however, a critical difference between 
decriminalizing marijuana by repealing existing law and 
authorizing marijuana, regulating it, and making a tremendous 
amount of money by taxing it.  Recognizing as much, the law of 
preemption distinguishes between failing to criminalize an 
activity and making the activity lawful.155  As a panel of the 
California Court of Appeals explained, “[w]hen an act is 
prohibited by federal law, but neither prohibited nor 
authorized by state law, there is no obstacle preemption.”156 
But, when a state moves beyond decriminalization and passes 
a law that affirmatively authorizes and regulates what federal 
law prohibits, the state’s law is preempted, and the anti-
commandeering doctrine is not implicated.157   
                                                 
154See Garvey & Yeh, supra note 36, at 13-14 (explaining that under the 
“Tenth Amendment and preemption precedent” a state could exempt 
marijuana-related activities from criminal penalties under state law).   
155See Pack v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 132 Cal. Rptr. 3d 633, 651 
(Cal. App. Ct. 2012).  In Pack, the court held that the CSA preempted 
a city ordinance requiring an expensive permit to grow or distribute 
medical marijuana.  Id. at 638.  The court’s decision was accepted for 
review by the Supreme Court of California, but the appeal was 
dismissed by request of the parties.  Pack v. Superior Court of Los 
Angeles, Case No. B228781, Order of Aug. 22, 2012) (available at, 
http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search/case/dockets.cfm?di
st=2&doc_id=1961761&doc_no=B228781).   
156Pack, 132 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 651.   
157Id. at 652 (“The City’s ordinance, however, goes beyond 
decriminalization into authorization . . . . A law which authorizes 
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Looking again to Colorado as an example, the state’s 
2012  marijuana legalization measure did more than simply 
repeal the state’s  statute that criminalized marijuana—it 
created a regulatory scheme that authorizes, permits, and 
collects large fees158 from marijuana-related activities that are 
prohibited by federal law.  More specifically, Colorado 
developed “procedures for the issuance, renewal, suspension, 
and revocation of licenses; provide[d] a schedule of licensing 
and renewal fees; and specif[ied] requirements for licensees to 
follow regarding physical security, video surveillance, labeling, 
health and safety precautions, and product advertising.”159  
There is now an entire state bureaucracy focused on nothing 
more than administering the marijuana industry.160  Because 
the state law expressly authorizes what federal law prohibits, it 
is preempted because it serves as an obstacle to the fulfillment 
of Congress’ goal to eliminate the manufacturing, distribution, 
possession, and use of marijuana.  
Of course, it is unlikely that a federal court will have the 
opportunity to reach that conclusion unless the Department of 
Justice changes its approach and files a lawsuit against the 
                                                 
individuals to engage in conduct that the federal Act forbids stands as 
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes 
and objectives of Congress and is therefore preempted.”) (internal 
quotations and alterations omitted); see also Emerald Steel Fabricators, 
Inc. v. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 348 Or. 159, 177-78 (2010) (en banc) 
(explaining that Oregon’s law was preempted because it went beyond 
exempting marijuana offenses from state prosecutions by 
“affirmatively authoriz[ing]” marijuana manufacturing, distribution, 
and possession); Garvey & Yeh, supra note 36, at 14 (stating that the 
“affirmative act of regulating and licensing marijuana cultivation and 
distribution may not invoke the same Tenth Amendment protections 
enjoyed by the states’ initial decision to simply remove marijuana-
related penalties under state law”).  
158Garvey & Yeh, supra note 36, at 5 (reporting that Colorado imposes 
a 25% tax on retail marijuana sales).   
159Id.    
160See https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/enforcement/marijuanaenforcement 
(website of the Marijuana Enforcement Division of the Colorado 
Department of Revenue).   
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offending states.    Although the filing of such a lawsuit after 
years of sitting on the sidelines while state marijuana 
legalization measures spread like wildfire will ruffle feathers 
and disrupt what has become a billion-dollar industry, it is the 
approach dictated by the law (as opposed to personal 
preference or political expediency).  Aside from the preemption 
issues discussed above, the Department of Justice’s current 
approach violates the Take Care Clause.  
 
V. TAKE CARE CLAUSE 
The Take Care Clause of the U.S. Constitution is, in 
comparison to other constitutional provisions, largely 
unknown and infrequently litigated.161  It provides in simple 
and direct language that the President “shall take Care that the 
Laws be faithfully executed.”162  Despite its brevity and relative 
obscurity, the Take Care Clause packs a mighty punch.  It 
ensures that the power of our federal government is dispersed 
among the different branches,163 and it prevents executive 
“lawlessness in the form of overreach or inaction.”164   
The Take Care Clause was designed to prevent 
Presidents (and their surrogates, such as the Attorney General) 
from doing exactly what the Department of Justice has done by 
refusing to enforce the CSA’s prohibition of marijuana in those 
states that have passed legalization measures.  It has been 
argued that the Department’s current approach is an 
unreviewable exercise of prosecutorial discretion rather than a 
                                                 
161See Ted Cruz, The Obama Administration’s Unprecedented Lawlessness, 
38 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 63, 70 (2015) (stating that “[o]nly a few 
Supreme Court cases have interpreted the Take Care Clause”).     
162U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.   
163See Todd Garvey, The Take Care Clause and Executive Discretion in the 
Enforcement of the Law, Congressional Research Service (Sept. 4, 2014) 
(explaining that the “Take Care Clause makes a significant 
contribution to the separation of powers”).     
164Sam Kamin, Prosecutorial Discretion in the Context of Immigration and 
Marijuana Law Reform: The Search for a Limiting Principle, 14 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 183, 196 (2016).   
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breach of the Take Care Clause.165  That argument lacks merit 
because there is a difference between prosecutorial discretion in 
individual cases (constitutional and necessary) and a blanket 
policy of non-enforcement (unconstitutional and dangerous).  
As explained below, the Department’s approach falls on the 
unconstitutional and dangerous side of the line.   
To understand the Take Care Clause and its purpose, a 
brief historical review is necessary.  Prior to the Glorious 
Revolution of 1688, the English crown possessed suspension 
and dispensation powers.166  Generally speaking, those powers 
allowed the king to nullify or simply disregard statutes passed 
by Parliament.167  Because Parliament rarely met and the king 
was viewed as the “source of all law,” the suspension and 
dispensation powers were viewed for many years as “useful 
and broadly accepted lubricants” that allowed the king to 
adjust the law as the circumstances required.168  Things changed 
when King James II came to power.169  He drew the ire of 
Parliament and the people when he began using his suspension 
and dispensation to “systematically dispense with a vast array 
of religious legislation and rules governing the universities.”170  
His actions contributed to the Glorious Revolution, which 
resulted in the ascension of William III to the crown and the 
elimination of the suspension and dispensation powers.171  The 
elimination of those powers was a “central achievement of the 
English Revolution . . . . [and] formed an important backdrop to 
the American constitutional enterprise.”172 
                                                 
165Id. at 200 (“In the context of federal marijuana law enforcement, it 
seems clear that the Obama administration’s guidance to prosecutors 
regarding the allocation of scarce resources is nothing more than an 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion.”).   
166Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 
VAND. L. REV. 671, 690-91 (2014).     
167Cruz, supra note 161, at 66. 
168Price, supra note 166, at 691. 
169Id. 
170Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 25, at 805 (internal quotations 
omitted).   
171See Price, supra note 166 at 691 (explaining that “William III and 
Mary II replaced King James on the throne.  As part of the new 
constitutional settlement, the monarch was henceforth denied 
suspending and dispensing powers.”).     
172Id. at 692.  
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Given the experience of their English ancestors, our 
Founding Fathers took pains to ensure that the President lacked 
the authority to “make, or alter, or dispense with the laws.”173  
Thus, they drafted the Take Care Clause and included it in 
Article II, § 3.  The Clause places upon the President “an 
obligation and affirmative duty” to enforce the laws passed by 
Congress.174  It is worth emphasizing “how strong the language 
of the Take Care Clause is.  It is pitched at the highest register 
of constitutional obligation.  The President shall—not may.”175  
In fact, it has been argued that the Take Care Clause is one of 
only two duties expressly imposed on the President by the 
Constitution—“he must take the Oath of Office . . . and he shall 
take care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”176  The 
obligation is not simply the President’s; rather, it is one that is 
borne by all Executive Branch officials.177  
Although the President has a role in the legislative 
process (most notably, the veto power), when a bill becomes a 
law the President’s “legislative role comes to an end and is 
supplanted by his express constitutional obligation under” the 
Take Care Clause.178  Noticeably absent from the Take Care 
Clause is a footnote clarifying that the President only has to 
faithfully execute the laws that he personally agrees with or 
those that are popular with his political base.179  Permitting the 
                                                 
173Garvey, supra note 163, at 5 (internal quotations omitted).   
174Cruz, supra note 161, at 69.   
175Brief for the Cato Institute, Professors Randy E. Barnett & Jeremy 
Rabkin as Amici Curiae, United States v. Texas, Supreme Court Case 
No. 15-674, 2016 WL 1377723, at *10 (Apr. 4, 2016) (discussing the 
history and purpose of the Take Care Clause).   
176Id. (internal citations omitted). 
177See generally Kamin, supra note 164 at 196 (stating that under the 
Take Care Clause “the federal executive is charged with taking care 
that the laws of the United States are faithfully executed”); see also 
Garvey, supra note 163, at 5 (explaining that the “President and 
executive branch officers must ‘faithfully’ implement and execute the 
law[s]”).   
178Garvey, supra note 136, at 5..   
179See Cruz, supra note 171, at 73 (stating that “the President’s 
obligation to enforce the laws does not include the power to disregard 
duly enacted laws when they become politically inconvenient”); see 
also Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 25, at 794 (explaining that the 
Constitution “imposes on the President a duty to enforce existing 
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President to ignore or modify congressional enactments would 
violate the separation of powers doctrine by “cloth[ing] the 
executive branch with the power of lawmaking.”180  If the 
Framers wanted the President to have that type of power, they 
would have given him suspension and dispensation powers 
instead of saddling him with an affirmative duty to faithfully 
execute the laws passed by Congress.  As Professors Delahunty 
and Yoo have explained, a “deliberate decision to leave a 
substantial area of statutory law unenforced or underenforced 
is a serious breach of Presidential duty.”181 
If you want to see an example of such a breach of 
Presidential duty, look no further than the Department of 
Justice’s approach to state marijuana legalization efforts.  The 
CSA is a longstanding federal law that makes it clear as day that 
marijuana is prohibited nationwide for both medicinal and 
recreational use.  Nonetheless, the Department announced that 
it would not prosecute marijuana offenders in those states that 
passed legalization measures.  Similarly, the Department 
refused to institute preemption proceedings against the 
offending states.  To the contrary, when two states (Oklahoma 
and Nebraska) tried to do the Department’s job for it by suing 
Colorado over its marijuana legalization law, the Department 
actually filed a brief supporting Colorado.182  Yes, you read that 
correctly—the U.S. Department of Justice came to the aid of the 
state that was violating federal law instead of those that were 
seeking to enforce it.  
                                                 
statutes, regardless of any policy differences with the Congresses that 
enacted them or the presidents who signed them”).  The president 
may, however, refuse to enforce a law if he believes the law violates 
the Constitution.  See Cruz, supra note 36, at 73-74 (“[I]f a President 
faces a decision between enforcing a law that Congress has passed and 
enforcing the Constitution, many scholars have argued that he is 
obligated to enforce the Constitution.”).  But, there have been very few 
circumstances where a president’s nonenforcement decision was 
based on a constitutional concern.  Id. at 74.      
180Garvey, supra note 163, at 5.   
181Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 25, at 785.   
182Lyle Denniston, U.S. Opposes Marijuana Challenge by Colorado’s 
Neighbors, SCOTUSBlog (Dec. 17, 2015) (available at, 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/12/u-s-opposes-marijuana-
challenge-by-colorados-neighbors/).  
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For the approximately thirty-nine-year period between 
the passage of the CSA in 1970 and 2009, the Department of 
Justice (in both Democratic and Republican administrations) 
took care to see that the CSA’s marijuana prohibition was 
faithfully executed.  That all changed approximately one year 
into President Obama’s term when his Deputy Attorney 
General announced that the Department would no longer seek 
to prosecute “individuals whose actions [we]re in clear and 
unambiguous compliance with existing state laws providing 
for the medical use of marijuana.”183  A later announcement 
extended that policy of non-enforcement to those living in 
states that authorized recreational marijuana.184  Further, those 
states have become marijuana meccas where people grow, sell, 
and smoke marijuana openly.  But, the words written into law 
by Congress remain unchanged—marijuana is a Schedule I 
controlled substance that is strictly prohibited, and its 
manufacture, distribution, and possession are punishable by 
imprisonment.  What had changed, however, is that the words 
written into law by Congress did not align with the policy 
preferences of those heading up the Executive Branch.185   
So, the Department of Justice simply decided to suspend 
the CSA in certain states and to grant dispensations to people 
                                                 
183October 19, 2009, Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General 
David W. Ogden to Selected United States Attorneys.   
184Aug. 29, 2013, Memorandum from James M. Cole to All United 
States Attorneys. 
185Both President Obama and Attorney General Holder have made 
public statements regarding their dissatisfaction with the CSA’s 
treatment of marijuana as a Schedule I controlled substance.  See, e.g. 
Jann S. Wenner, The Day After: Obama on His Legacy, Trump's Win and 
the Path Forward, ROLLING STONE MAGAZINE (Nov. 29, 2016) (available 
at, http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/features/obama-on-his-
legacy-trumps-win-and-the-path-forward-w452527) (quoting 
President Obama as saying that he believes marijuana should be 
treated the “same way we do with cigarettes or alcohol”); see also Nick 
Wing, Eric Holder Says It’s Ridiculous To Treat Weed Like Heroin, But He 
Can’t Do Anything About It Now, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 24, 2016) 
(quoting Eric Holder as saying “we treat marijuana in the same way 
that we treat heroin now, and that clearly is not appropriate”).  
Ironically, as the Attorney General, Holder could have addressed the 
issue lawfully by exercising his authority under 21 U.S.C. § 811(a)-(b) 
to remove marijuana from Schedule I of the CSA.  He failed to do so.    
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who grow, sell, and possess marijuana in those states.  There is 
one slight problem.  The American President and his surrogates 
in the Department of Justice are not 17th-century English 
monarchs who possess suspension and dispensation powers.186  
That was the whole point of the Take Care Clause.187  If the 
President and the attorney general wanted marijuana to be 
treated differently by federal law, they should have lobbied 
Congress or followed the administrative rescheduling process 
that Congress set forth in 21 U.S.C. § 811.   
Some have defended the Department’s non-
enforcement policy as a permissible exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion, rather than an abdication of the “take care” duty.188  
That argument has some surface appeal.  But, it crumbles upon 
closer inspection because there is a difference between 
prosecutorial discretion and a policy of non-enforcement.189  
The former is entirely permissible and virtually 
unchallengeable, the latter is a violation of the Take Care 
Clause.190  To understand why, it is necessary to look at what 
prosecutorial discretion is and the purpose that it serves.     
 The concept of prosecutorial discretion reflects an 
understanding that the executive branch’s duty to enforce the 
                                                 
186See 4A U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel 55 (1980) (opinion by Office 
Legal Counsel explaining that “[t]he President has no ‘dispensing 
power[,]’ meaning that the President and his subordinates may not 
lawfully defy an Act of Congress if the Act is constitutional”).   
187See Cruz, supra note 161, at 114 (“The Take Care Clause was 
explicitly included in the Constitution to prevent the President from 
wielding the suspension and dispensation powers that had been 
abused by English kings.”).   
188See Kamin, supra note 164, at 200 (opining that “the Obama 
administration’s guidance to prosecutors regarding the allocation of 
scarce resources is nothing more than an exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion”).   
189See Brief of former U.S. Attorneys General as Amici Curiae, United 
States v. Texas, Supreme Court Case No. 15-674, 2016 WL 1319656, at 
*3 (Apr. 4, 2016) (explaining that “the Executive’s authority to exercise 
discretion in the enforcement of the laws does not encompass the far 
broader power to authorize . . . class-wide relief”).   
190See Cruz, supra note 161, at 77 (“[I]t would violate the Take Care 
Clause for a President to invoke prosecutorial discretion as a means 
of failing to enforce those laws of which the President disapproves.”) 
(internal quotations omitted).   
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laws does not have to be “performed robotically.”191  Rather, 
federal prosecutors (as the President’s surrogates) have the 
power to decide whether to bring charges in a particular case.  
Generally speaking, a prosecutor’s refusal to bring charges is 
not subject to judicial review.  As the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit has explained:  “It follows, as an incident of the 
constitutional separation of powers, that the courts are not to 
interfere with the free exercise of the discretionary powers of 
the attorneys of the United States in their control over criminal 
prosecutions.”192   
 Generally speaking, the decision of whether to institute 
a prosecution is made by a prosecutor after considering the facts 
and circumstances of a particular situation.  It is a case-specific 
judgment call that is based on such things as the strength of the 
evidence, the credibility of witnesses, the constitutionality of 
police conduct, the preferences of a victim, the potential 
defendant’s criminal history, and resource constraints.  A 
federal prosecutor’s exercise of discretion is to be guided by the 
parameters set forth in a chapter of the U.S. Attorney’s Manual 
entitled “Principles of Federal Prosecution.”193  That chapter 
begins with the general rule that an “attorney for the 
government should commence or recommend federal 
prosecution if he/she believes that the person’s conduct 
constitutes a federal offense, that the admissible evidence will 
probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction, and 
that a substantial federal interest would be served by the 
prosecution.”194  A case that meets those requirements should 
be prosecuted,195 unless “(1) The person is subject to effective 
                                                 
191See Price, supra note 166, at 696.   
192United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965).   
193U.S. Dep’t of Justice, United States Attorneys’ Manual § 9-27.220 
(available at, https://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-27000-
principles-federal-prosecution#9-27.200).     
194Id.   
195See Michael Edmund O’Neill, When Prosecutors Don’t: Trends in 
Federal Prosecutorial Discretion, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 221, 237 (2003) 
(discussing the Principles of Federal Prosecution and stating that “the 
expectation is that where legal evidence of an offense exists, a 
prosecutor is expected to initiate criminal proceedings”).   
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prosecution in another jurisdiction; or (2) There exists an 
adequate non-criminal alternative to prosecution.”196    
 As a trio of former U.S. Attorneys General197 have 
explained, “[e]ach of these situations is intensely case—and 
person—specific. . . .the core of the discretionary authority 
exclusively reserved to the Executive is the authority to make a 
decision in particular cases regarding particular individuals.”198  
Put another way, “executive officials hold discretion only to 
make case-specific exceptions to enforcement.”199  Thus, the 
doctrine of prosecutorial discretion does not provide the 
Attorney General with the authority to decline prosecutions 
“on a categorical or prospective basis.”200 Nor can the Attorney 
General rely on the doctrine of prosecutorial discretion to 
justify the creation of a policy against enforcing a particular 
provision of federal law.201  Prosecutorial discretion is not 
unfettered—the “mere invocation of prosecutorial or 
enforcement discretion is not to be treated as a magical 
incantation”202 that allows the executive to disregard 
congressional enactments.   
 Although the judiciary generally refuses to review 
exercises of prosecutorial discretion, the courts have recognized 
that there is a difference between the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion in an individual case and an agency non-enforcement 
policy.203  As the Department of Justice itself previously 
                                                 
196U.S. Dep’t of Justice, United States Attorneys’ Manual § 9-27.220 
(available at, https://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-27000-
principles-federal-prosecution#9-27.200). 
197The trio consisted of Edwin Meese III, Richard Thornburg, and John 
Ashcroft.  Brief of former U.S. Attorneys General as Amici Curiae, 
United States v. Texas, Supreme Court Case No. 15-674, 2016 WL 
1319656, at *1 (Apr. 4, 2016).     
198Id. at *11, *13.   
199Price, supra note 166, at 677.   
200Cruz, supra note 161, at 76-77 (internal quotations omitted).   
201See Brief of former U.S. Attorneys General as Amici Curiae, United 
States v. Texas, Supreme Court Case No. 15-674, 2016 WL 1319656, at 
*13 (Apr. 4, 2016) (discussing the difference between individualized 
prosecutorial discretion and a blanket policy of nonenforcement).  
202Garvey, supra note 163, at 25 (internal quotations omitted).   
203See id. at 25-26 (discussing the judiciary’s attempts to distinguish 
between traditional prosecutorial discretion and an agency 
nonenforcement policy).   
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admitted, “the individual prosecutorial decision is 
distinguishable from instances in which courts have reviewed 
the legality of general Executive Branch policies.”204  While the 
courts will not “assume the essentially Executive function of 
deciding whether a particular alleged violator should be 
prosecuted,” they will make the “conventionally judicial 
determination of whether certain fixed policies allegedly 
followed by the Justice Department and the United States 
Attorney’s office lie outside the constitutional and statutory 
limits of ‘prosecutorial discretion.’”205  And, the question of 
whether a Department of Justice policy of not enforcing a 
particular law violates the Take Care Clause is one that can be 
reviewed by the judicial branch.206 
It is a good thing that such review is available.  Consider 
the consequences of allowing the Executive Branch to refuse the 
enforcement of duly-enacted laws under the guise of 
prosecutorial discretion.  An  Executive Branch that believed 
there was too much environmental regulation could refuse to 
prosecute people who dumped pollutants into the waterways.  
An Executive Branch that disagreed with federal firearm laws 
could refuse to prosecute people who sold guns to convicted 
                                                 
2048 Op. O.L.C. 101, 126 (1984).   
205Nader v. Saxbe, 497 F.2d 676, 679 (D.C. Cir. 1974).    
206Id. at 679, n.19 (quoting the Take Care Clause and noting that the 
“law has long recognized the distinction between judicial usurpation 
of discretionary authority and judicial review of the statutory and 
constitutional limits to that authority.  Judicial review of the latter sort 
is normally available unless Congress has expressly withdrawn it.”) 
(internal citations omitted).  Interestingly, the Supreme Court of the 
United States last term asked the parties in the case of United States v. 
Texas to address whether the Obama administration’s policy of not 
enforcing certain immigration laws constituted a violation of the Take 
Care Clause.  See Leticia M. Saucedo, The Supreme Court Adds ‘Take 
Care Clause’ to the DAPA Debate, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SOCIETY 
BLOG (Jan. 19, 2016) (available at, 
http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/the-supreme-court-adds-
%E2%80%98take-care-clause%E2%80%99-to-the-dapa-debate).  The 
issue was briefed and argued, but the Court did not issue a decision 
in the case because Justice Scalia died during the pendency of the case 
and the remaining justices deadlocked 4-4.  See United States v. Texas, 
136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (per curiam) (“The judgment is affirmed by an 
equally divided court.”).        
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felons.  An Executive Branch that disliked the tax system could 
refrain from prosecuting tax fraud cases.  And, an Executive 
Branch that favored drug legalization could stop prosecuting 
drug dealers.  If that is what prosecutorial discretion allows, 
then it “threatens to undermine the constitutional lawmaking 
process.”207  And, we should stop referring to the bills passed 
by Congress and signed by the President as “laws.” A more apt 
description would be “suggestions for the Executive Branch.”  
The Take Care Clause was designed to prevent that very thing 
from happening.   
 At bottom, the Department of Justice’s refusal to enforce 
the CSA’s marijuana prohibition in those states that have 
legalized marijuana is not an exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion.  The decision of whether to prosecute is not being 
made on an individualized basis—a federal prosecutor is not 
considering the evidence, looking at the circumstances, 
applying the factors set forth in the U.S. Attorney’s Manual, and 
deciding whether a prosecution is warranted against a 
particular suspect.  Rather, there is an articulated non-
enforcement policy that effectively exempts the residents of 
twenty-six states from federal marijuana law.  As the U.S. 
House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary 
reported, “the breadth of the Justice Department’s position on 
marijuana non-enforcement goes well beyond the limits of 
prosecutorial discretion . . . the guidance to U.S. Attorneys 
establishes a formal, department-wide policy of selective non-
enforcement of an Act of Congress.”208  In his famous speech 
entitled “The Federal Prosecutor,” then-Attorney General (later 
Justice) Robert H. Jackson warned against such behavior, 
stating:  “The federal government could not enforce one kind of 
law in one place and another kind elsewhere. . . . the only long-
term policy that will save federal justice from being discredited 
by entanglements with local politics is that it confine itself to 
strict and impartial enforcement of federal law, letting the chips 
                                                 
207Cruz, supra note 161, at 78.   
208Report No. 113-377 of the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House 
of Representatives, regarding Executive Needs to Faithfully Observe 
and Respect Congressional Enactments of Law (ENFORCE) Act of 
2014 (Mar. 7, 2014).   
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fall in the community where they may.”209  The Department of 
Justice has disregarded Justice Jackson’s admonition, choosing 
instead to adopt a policy that violates the President’s duty to 
“take care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”210 
 
VI. CONCLUSION  
 
The approach that the Department of Justice has taken 
to state laws legalizing marijuana over the past eight years must 
not continue.  At the end of the day, federal law is federal law—
meaning that it applies equally in all fifty states regardless of 
what laws a state may pass.  It is not only terrible policy for the 
federal government to allow states to make a mockery of federal 
law, but it is also unconstitutional.  The notion that people in 
one part of the country can violate federal law with impunity 
while people in another part of the country go to federal prison 
for engaging in the same conduct is un-American.  If the time 
has come to change the way federal law treats marijuana, then 
that change needs to occur in a lawful manner—either by 
passing a bill that is signed into law by the President or by 
following the administrative rescheduling procedure set forth 
in 21 U.S.C. § 811(a)-(b).  Until that occurs, the Department of 
Justice should return to doing its job by enforcing federal 
marijuana law uniformly throughout the United States.    
 
  
                                                 
209Robert H. Jackson, Attorney General of the United States, Speech at 
the Second Annual Conference of United States Attorneys: The 
Federal Prosecutor at 6 (Apr. 1, 1940).   
210U.S. CONST., art. III, § 3.     
